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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone conpany, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound interstitialchange in the very tissue of the law."-OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 269.

Recent Cases
LANDLORD AND TENANT-RELAXATION OF ABANDONMENT REQUIREMENT FOR

CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION, DURING CRITICAL HOUSING SHORTAGE.

Majen Realty Corporation v. Glotzer1
In an action for two months
claim of constructive eviction by
pair of damage to the apartment
practical purposes of the entire

back rent, defendant asserts as set off or defense a
reason of the plaintiff's failure to make prompt recaused by fire which deprived the defendant for all
use of the apartment during the first month and

1946). 1946
Y. City Cts.
S. (2d)
195of (N.
61 N.ofY.
Published by 1.
University
Missouri
School
Law Scholarship
Repository,
(440)

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1946], Art. 2

19461

RECENT CASES

partial use during the second month, altlough at no time had the defendant abandoned the premises. In denying full recovery of rent to the plaintiff, the court took
judicial notice of the critical housing shortage existing in New York City and relaxed the rule that there must be an actual abandonment under the defense of
partial constructive eviction.
The great weight of authority is to the effect that to constitute constructive
eviction, some act of a permanent character must be done by the landlord or paramount title holder witl the intention and effect of depriving the tenant of the
full beneficial enjoyment of the premises, to which the tenant yields. 2
It has been remarked that "the propositions that there can be retention of
demised premises, and an eviction, are logically and legally contradictory" 3 and
further that it would be unjust to permit the tenant to remain in possession and
escape the payment of rent by pleading a state of facts which, though conferring
a right to abandon, had been unaccompanied by the exercise of that right.4
Although it is true that the courts usually speak of a particular act or series
on the part of the landlord as constituting a constructive eviction vel Zon without
any reference to the subsequent relinquishment of possession by the tenant, this
is not a strictly accurate mode of expression, since parting with the possession is as
much a part of the eviction when the tenant leaves as a result of the landlord's
interference withi his enjoyment as when he is forcibly ousted, he being in theory
ousted by the landlord in the former case as in the latter.
The court in the instant case unequivocally recognizes this doctrine5 and asserts
that the rule should still prevail where a market of available apartments or dwelling
accommodations exists. It points out however "that rule rests upon the reasoning
that if the premises in face were not fit for occupancy, the tenant would not have
retained possession but would have moved elsewhere, and his remaining in the
premises belies any claim that they were not fit and habitable."6 After setting
2. Warren v. Wagner, 75 Ala. 188 (1883); Hayner v. Smith, 63 Ill. 430
(1872) (where right to obtain power from belt was appurtenant to room leased,
landlord's act of disconnecting belt from source of power with intent of stopping
tenant's business); Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201 (1870); Brown v. Holyoke
Water Power Co., 152 Mass. 463, 25 N. E. 966 (1890) (where store was leased
with vacant lot in rear, landlord's act of excavating lot for creation of building
darkened tenant's premises); Skally v. Shute, 132 Mass. 367 (1881); Doyle v.
Lord, 64 N. Y. 432 (1876); see also Bannister Real Estate Co. v. Edwards, 282
S. W. 139 (Mo. App. 1926); Jackson v. Eddy, 12 Mo. 209 (1848) . For additional
decisions see annotation, (1921) 20 A. L. R. 1370.
3. Mortimer v. Brunner, 19 N. Y. Super. Ct. (6 Bosw.) 653 (1860. It is
said in Koehler v. Schneider, 15 Daley 198, 203, 4 N. Y. Supp. 611 (1889), that
the statement that a tenant while remaining in possession, cannot assert an eviction,
"is only another way of saying that one cannot raise the defense of eviction unless
he has been evicted."
4. Legier v. Deveneau, 98 Vt. 188, 126 Adt. 392 (1924).
5. Two Rector Street Corp. v. Bein, 226 App. Div. 73, 234 N. Y. Supp. 409
(lst Dept. 1929), is cited in support of this proposition.
6. 'Majen Realty Corporation v. Glotzer, instant case at 196.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol11/iss4/2
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up what the court regards as the basis for the rule of abandonment, it justifies an
exception by reasoning that "where there are no living accommodations available
elsewhere or there is such a scarcity of them that impels the legislature to declare
a public emergency to exist because of such a condition, the reason upon which
the rule is based disappears, and the rule should therefore be relaxed."7
The decision, however, is not as adverse to the landlord as might appear from
the language used, for the court's final determination was that "because of the
non-use and inability to use a portion of the premises, under present existing conditions, that will be considered a surrender of possession of that portion constituting
a partial constructive eviction" therefore the court will ".

.

. make an allowance

for diminished facilities and services accorded the tenant through the neglect of
the landlord" and "allow an abatement or offset to the extent of diminished services
and facilities, which it finds to be three-fourths of the February rent and one-half
of the March rent." "
The general rule, however, in cases of partial actual eviction by the landlord
is that the court will not apportion the landlord's wrong, thus the landlord cannot
recover any of the rent. Many decisions so holding are set out in early annotations9 and are supported by later cases.' 0 These assert that an act which deprives
the tenant of the use and enjoyment of a portion of the leased premises constitutes
a partial eviction which may be relied upon by the tenant in an action for the
rent without surrendering possession of the balance of the premises. Thus, where
without the consent of the tenant the landlord entered upon the leased premises
and made repairs, it was held to constitute a partial eviction suspending the rent,
the lease not giving such authority to the landlord." A Michigan case12 points out
that in an action to recover rent where there has been a partial eviction by the landlord the tenant may remain in possession during the remaider of the term without
paying rent, for the law will not aid the landlord in collecting the rent of the
portion reserved because neither party to a lease can apportion the rent. It is
submitted that this rule is applicable in cases of constructive partial eviction as well
as in cases of actual partial eviction.13
Under that reasoning, which apparently the majority of the American jurisdictions and New York' 4 has followed in the past, it would appear that the court
would not apportion the rent on the theory that it could no more alter the terms
of the lease than either party could. However the court reaches an entirely different
conclusion and states that "The local area office of the Office of Price Administration
7. Id. at 197.
8. Ibid.
9. See annotation in (1921) 20 A. L. R. 1372.
10. Franks v. Rogers, 156 Ark. 120, 245 S. W. 311 (1922); Ravet v. Garelick,
221 Mich. 70, 190 N. W. 637,28 A. L. R. 1331 (1922); Lewis v. Minneapolis Invest.
Co., 190 N. W. 70 (Minn. 1922).
11. Harperly Hall Co. v. Joseph, 187 N. Y. Supp. 120 (1st Dept. 1921).
12. Ravet v. Garelick, 221 Mich. 70, 190 N. W. 637, 28 A. L. R. 1331 (1922).
13. 2 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (1912) § 185e.
14. Seigel v. Neary, 38 Misc. 297, 77 N. Y. Supp. 854 (Ist Dept. 1902).
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would be authorized... to reduce the maximum rent for any diminution of services
or facilities, and there is no reason whyr the court cannot similarly make an allow-

ance for diminished facilities and services accorded the tenant through the neglect
of the landlord, which constitutes a statutory violation, such as here is found
to exist."
There are various reasons for failure to leave the premises that have been
recognized by the courts as justifying the tenant in continuance of possession, altlough he interposes a claim of constructive eviction,15 one of which is the claim
that the tenant remained in possession waiting for repairs. In Hartenbauer v.
Brumbaug.' 1 it was held that the lessee did not waive her right to claim an eviction
by remaining a few months in order to give the landlord an opportunity to remedy
the condition complained of as constituting an eviction. In Krausi v. Fife,,7 in
holding that five months continued occupancy after the plumbing became defective
was not excessive, the court said that "The tenant was entitled to a reasonable time
within which to abandon the premises." It has moreover been held that notwithstanding the fact that the landlord did not promise to improve conditions, continued
occupancy by the tenant may not be unreasonable if it appears that he believed
that there was a fair prospect of improving conditions through his own affirmative
act."' 8 Yet even under the authority of these cases, actual abandonment must
subsequently follow before the claim of constructive eviction can be interposed.
Apparently the court in relaxing the requirement of abandonment for a defense
of constructive eviction in an action for rent, and in permitting an apportionment
of the rent, found it justifiable to do so to reach an equitable conclusion under unprecedented shortages affecting both parties.
EUGENE E. ANDERECK

15. Hartenbauer v. Brumbaugh, 220 Ill. App. 326 (1920) (sickness or physical disability); Laffey v. Wookhull, 256 Ill. App. 325 (1930); Rome v. Johnson,
174 N. E. 716 (Mass. 1931) (time for finding new location); Minneapolis Co-Op
Co. v. Williamson, 51 Minn. 53, 52 N. W. 986 (1892) (reaccuring or cumulative
causes for abandonment); Heilbrun v. Aaronson, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1096 (1909);
Siebold v. Heyman, 120 N. Y. 105 (1909); Batterman v. Levenson, 102 Misc.
92, 168 N. Y. Supp. 197 (2d dept. 1917); Graecen v. Barker, 130 N. Y. Supp. 141
(1911); Marks v. Dellaglio, 56 App. Div. 299, 67 N. Y. Supp. 736 (1st Dept.
1900) (promise by landlord to remedy conditions); Cowie v. Goodwin, 9 C. & P.
376, 173 Eng. Rep. R. 877 (1840).
16. 220 Ill. App. 326 (1920).
17. 120 App. Div. 490, 105 N. Y. Supp. 384 (2d Dept. 1907).
18. New York State Investing Co. v. Wolf, 84 Misc. 66, 145 N. Y. Supp. 945
(Ist Dept. 1914), where the period of occupancy was two monthQ-
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